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hearing, or even a suggestion of a hearing on the serious charge
that he had made.' ' 3 Believing that due process of law, as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, had been denied and
that the conviction and sentence was void, it ordered the prisoner
discharged. The court warned that to "condone the methods
evidenced in this case, is to invite grave injustice. There is one
way to stop a practice that has become altogether too commonand that is to bring it to a conscious level where the public can
scrutinize it and take such steps as are necessary to insure a true
rendition of justice to all, regardless of race, color or creed." 5
The legal profession should be especially conscious of the validity
of these remarks.
V. FAMILY LAW
The usual large array of interesting cases was lacking, this
year, in the field of family law, but a few decisions are worthy
of attention. Among such is the case of LaRue v. LaRue,' for
it serves to reemphasize a distinction which should be remembered.
The decree for divorce there granted to the wife directed payment
to the plaintiff of a sum found due her on an unpaid loan between
the parties. The defendant did not pay as ordered, so the ex-wife
sought a rule to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. The ex-husband answered by admitting his failure
to pay but pleaded that, by reason of a prior adjudication in bankruptcy in which proceedings he had listed the debt, the divorce
court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.2 The lower court
rejected the contention and found defendant to be in contempt.
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the Second District ruled the
contempt order improper.
It pointed out that certain money payments called for by
divorce decrees are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, but it distinguished between the payment here provided for and one calling
for the payment of alimony. Obligations of the latter kind are
53 86 F. Supp. 382 at 387.
54 86 F. Supp. 382 at 387.
1341 Ill.App. 411, 93 N. E. (2d) 823 (1950).
2 Jones v. Alton & S. R. Co., 5 F. Supp. 532 (1934).
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not subject to discharge except by payment,3 but a provision in
a divorce decree for the payment of a loan does not, by that fact,
change the character of the obligation from that of an ordinary
civil debt nor effect a change in the ordinary creditor-debtor
status of the parties. Such being the case, a contempt order directing the incarceration of the defendant would be violative of
the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt..4
While it is true that, under special circumstances, an equity court
may imprison a person who refuses to abide by its decree, 5 even
when the contempt is civil in character, that power is seldom
used to force compliance with a decree calling for the payment
of money.6 There is even less reason for considering the use
of the contempt power after a discharge in bankruptcy, as the
equity court is then wholly without power to adjudge the defend7
ant guilty.
The much-litigated case of Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbargers
again invites attention. The point presently at issue concerned
the power of a divorce court to entertain a petition by the former
wife for an allowance to cover attorney's fees for services rendered subsequent to the entry of the decree. The lower court dismissed the petition for an alleged want of jurisdiction, but the
Appellate Court reversed. Statutory authority does exist to
warrant trial court action in making an allowance to cover fees
and expenses incurred in order to defend a decree as well as to
enforce the payment of amounts covered thereby.9 This the
3 Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 21 S. Ct. 735, 45 L. Ed. 1009 (1901);
Welty v. Welty, 195 Ill. 335, 63 N. E. 161, 88 Am. St. Rep. 208 (1902) ; Barclay
v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N. E. 636, 51 L. R. A. 351 (1900).
4 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 2, § 12.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 42. See also People v. LaMothe, 331 Ill.
351, 163 N. E. 3, 60 A. L. R. 316 (1928) ; People v. Zimmer, 238 Ill. 607, 87 N. E.
845 (1909).
6 Tudor v. Firebaugh, 364 Ill. 283, 4 N. E. (2d) 393 (1936) ; Goodwillie v. Millimann, 56 Ill. 523 (1870).
7 The effect of a bankruptcy adjudication on the power of an equity court to
imprison for failure to pay a civil debt is discussed in Parker v. United States.
153 F. (2d) 66, 163 A. L. R. 379 (1946).
8341 Ill. App. 107, 93 N. E. (2d) 380 (1950).
The original decree granted to
the husband, defendant herein, was set aside in 324 Ill. App. 176, 57 N. E. (2d)
901 (1944). A decree in favor of the plaintiff was upheld in 336 Ill. App. 226
83 N. E. (2d) 382 (1948), abst. opin., and leave to appeal was denied.
9 11. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 16.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

defendant was willing to concede, but he claimed that, as he had
paid the judgment prior to the wife's petition, the judgment had
passed "beyond review, for the satisfaction thereof is the last
act and end of the proceeding."' 1 The higher court, in rejecting this contention, viewed the petition as a supplementary proceeding to be governed by general chancery rules,1 ' even though
filed in a divorce action. Under such rules, bills or petitions may
be filed, after final decree, to enforce rights originally omitted
or not put in issue, so long as the purpose thereof is not to avoid
the original decree. 1 2 Support for that holding exists in certain
other Illinois non-divorce cases. 18
The divorce attorney may, at times, whistle for his supper
with disappointing results, according to the case of Hefner v.
Hefner.1 4 It was there held that an unpaid attorney who had
acted for the plaintiff in a divorce action, which suit had later
been dismissed on stipulation by the parties without notice to
the attorney, could not reinstate the case for the purpose of
securing a determination as to his fees. The Appellate Court for
15
the First District ruled that Section 16 of the Divorce Act
could not be construed as authorizing the court to order a client
to pay his or her own attorney nor serve to support an order
intended to bind both parties. 16 The attorney was left to an
action at law predicated on the employment contract, for the
10 See In re Baby's Estate, 87 Cal. 200 at 202, 25 P. 405, 22 Am. St. Rep. 239
(1890).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 16. See also Bowman v. Bowman, 64 Il.
75 (1872).
12 Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 14 S. Ct. 136, 37 L. Ed. 1123 (1893).
13 Chicago Artesian Well Co. v. Connecticut Mut. Life Assur. Co., 57 Ill. 424
(1870) ; Eggers v. Adler, 248 Ill. App. 118 (1928) ; Prindeville v. Curran, 156 Ill.
In Eggers v. Adler, 248 Ill.App. 118 at 125, the court said:
App. 278 (1910).
"The jurisdiction of a court of chancery over undisposed of matters does not end
at the expiration of the term at which a particular final decree may be entered."
14338 Ill. App. 179, 86 N. E. (2d) 885 (1949), noted in 27 CHIoAGo-KENT LAW
RLVIEw 337.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 16.
16 The court also termed the action an attempt to interfere, contrary to public
policy, with a reconciliation of the parties: Watson v. Watson, 335 Ill. App. 637,
82 N. E. (2d) 671 (1948) ; Mayer v. Mayer, 320 Ill. App. 588, 51 N. E. (2d) 804
(1943) ; Labanauskas v. Labanauskas, 228 Ill. App. 273 (1923).
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recent amendment to Section 16 was said not to aid in the situ17
ation.
Legislative attempts to produce administrative reforms in
the handling of divorce cases,' 8 while still meeting the constitutional requirements emphasized by the Supreme Court in Hunt
v. County of Cook,' 9 were declared to be a failure in the case
of People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek.2 0 The first statute had been
stricken down because the contemplated reforms were limited to
use in Cook County. The more recent act made the proposed
reforms optional in any judicial circuit according to the vote of
a majority of the judges thereof. While this change removed the
statute from the category of special legislation, it foundered on
the rock of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The
Supreme Court expressed agreement with the social philosophy
which had moved the legislature to act, but the existence of other
constitutional faults 21 makes it doubtful whether any statute
designed to effect those ends could be validly framed.
Only one case produced any development in the law relating
to the rights of children. The present Adoption Act does not
countenance the adoption of an adult person in Illinois, 22 but
the lawful adoption elsewhere of a person who has reached his
majority will, according to McLaughlin v. People,2 3 permit the
one so adopted to have the benefit of a child's exemption under
the local inheritance tax act. 24 The facts there appeared to be
that, some six months prior to her death, the testatrix had adopted
17 Il. Laws 1947, p. 818, S. B. No. 417, gave to the court a discretionary power
to make the allowance as to fees payable directly to the attorney, on which allowance execution could issue as on any judgment.
18 II. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 105.19, et seq.
19398 Ill. 412, 76 N. E. (2d) 48 (1947), noted In 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvnnw
62.
20405 Ill. 510, 91 N. E. (2d) 588 (1950), noted in 38 Ill. B. J. 585.
21 These were: (1) an invasion of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court
as well as that vested in courts entitled to try divorce cases; (2) the granting of aid

to religious groups to spread their faiths through the use of a tax-supported instrumentality; (3) the denial of substantive due process; and (4) the denial
of adjective due process by reason of an absence of provisions for evidentiary
safeguards.
22

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1 et seq.

23403 Ill. 493, 87 N. E. (2d) 637 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAw Rvrvw
174, 38 Ill. B. J. 292, and 1950 Ill. L. Forum 122.
24

nIl.

Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375.
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the appellant, then forty-six years old, in accordance with Connecticut law. When it appeared that valuable Illinois real estate
had passed to the adopted child, the state claimed an inheritance
tax based on rates and exemptions applicable to a stranger to the
blood.
25
While Illinois will, pursuant to the federal constitution,
give full faith and credit to an adoption decree of a sister state,
treating it in the same manner as a local decree when determining
rights of inheritance, ' 26 provided the status of the adopted child
has not been acquired in violation of any express provision
of the positive law of Illinois, that fact alone does not settle the
question of tax liability. It is within the power of the state where
realty is located to determine what restrictions, whether in the
form of taxation or otherwise, are to be imposed on the right of
inheritance, provided the tax so imposed is uniform as to the
class upon which it operates. 27 It became necessary, therefore,
to construe the phrase "a child or children legally adopted" as
the same appears in the Illinois Inheritance Tax Act.2 8
The state contended that, adoption of an adult being impossible under Illinois law, the phrase necessarily referred only to
those persons who had been legally adopted while still minors.
The court, reviewing the history of inheritance tax laws in this
state, ruled otherwise. At one time, the child's favorable exemption and lower tax rate had been limited to natural children or
"any child or children adopted as such in conformity with the
laws of Illinois. "29 The statute was amended, in 1919, so as to
delete the last-quoted phrase and, in place thereof, the present
words "any child or children legally adopted" were substituted.
That change, said the court, was not the result of an oversight
U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.
26 McNamara v. McNamara, 303 Il. 191, 135 N. E. 410 (1922), cert. den. 260
U. S. 734, 43 S. Ct. 95, 67 L. Ed. 487 (1922); VanMatre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536,
36 N. E. 628, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196, 23 L. R. A. 665 (1893) ; Keegan v. Geraghty,
101 Ill. 26 (1881).
27 Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611, 35 S. Ct. 718, 59 L. Ed. 1144 (1915) ; Olmstead
v. Olmstead, 216 U. S. 386, 30 S. Ct. 292, 54 L. Ed. 530 (1910) ; In re Estate of
Speed, 216 Il1. 23, 74 N. E. 809, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189 (1905).
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375.
29 Laws 1909, p. 312.
25
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but represented a deliberate act of the legislature to extend the
benefit of the section to any person, minor or adult, who had
been validly adopted under the laws of a sister state.
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.

There is little of truly startling news to report concerning
developments in the law of real property, but some new points
have been made. Scientific progress which has been made in extracting crude oil from the earth produced one new problem.
The practice of using re-pressuring methods to increase production from wells where the natural flow of oil has declined because
of the exhaustion of original gas pressures is common enough to
be recognized as conforming with reasonably prudent and competent operating procedures, but the right to the lessor of an oil
interest to oppose such activities remained undecided until raised
in the case of Carter Oil Company v. Dees.1 The plaintiff-lessee
there desired to convert an offset well on the defendant's property
into a gas input well so as to restore pressure. Defendant had
objected on the ground that the proposed action would cause a
migration of oil underlying his property to the land of others.
It was true that the oil driven off would be replaced by a return
flow which could then be captured at a large profit to himself,
but the lessor preferred, perhaps for tax reasons, to continue the
traditional mode of production without the proposed re-pressuring. 2 The oil lease was silent as to methods of production, but the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District found for the plaintiff
in a declaratory judg-ment proceeding, stating that the conversion
would not deprive the lessor of any portion of his royalty and
1340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N. E. (2d) 519
opinion.
2 It more frequently happens that it
intensive and diligent operation by the
in which it is the lessee who is faced
modern techniques.

(1950).

Culbertson, J., wrote a dissenting

is the lessor who seeks to compel more
lessee. It would appear to be a rare case
with the owner's objection to the use of

